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Abstract
Current methods for authentication based on public-key cryptography are vulner-
able to quantum computing. We propose a novel approach to authentication in
which communicating parties are viewed as autonomous agents which interact
repeatedly using their private decision models. The security of this approach
rests upon the difficulty of learning the model parameters of interacting agents,
a problem which we conjecture is also hard for quantum computing. We develop
methods which enable a server agent to classify a client agent as either legitimate
or adversarial based on their past interactions. Moreover, we use reinforcement
learning techniques to train server policies which effectively probe the client’s de-
cisions to achieve more sample-efficient authentication, while making modelling
attacks as difficult as possible via entropy-maximization principles. We empiri-
cally validate our methods for authenticating legitimate users while detecting dif-
ferent types of adversarial attacks.
1 Introduction
Authentication and key agreement protocols are the foundation for secure communication over com-
puter networks. Most protocols in use today are based on public-key cryptographic methods such as
Diffie-Hellman key exchange, the RSA cryptosystem, and elliptic curve cryptosystems [4]. These
methods rely on the difficulty of certain number theoretic problems such as integer factorization or
the discrete logarithm problem. However, it is known that these problems can be solved efficiently
using quantum computing [24]. Thus, researchers are studying alternative mathematical problems
believed to be safe against quantum computing [4]. Standards organizations such as ETSI [9] and
NIST [7] are actively calling for new quantum-safe proposals for standardization.
In this paper, we propose a novel formulation of authentication and key agreement inspired by
research in machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI). In the proposedmethod, communicating
parties are viewed as autonomous agents which interact repeatedly within an abstract setting using
their private decision models. Authentication and key agreement are based solely on the agents’
observed behaviors during the interaction, and no private information is sent at any time during the
process. Our approach creates a bridge to machine learning and AI research in two crucial ways:
Security – The method’s security rests upon the difficulty of modelling an agent’s decisions from
limited observations about its behavior. This is a long-standing problem in AI research and known
to be hard [1]. We conjecture that the problem is as hard for quantum computing, since the problem
is fundamentally one of missing information regarding the causality in an agent’s decisions, and the
space of possible decision models is uncountable. There are no known quantum algorithms to solve
opponent modelling [1]; indeed, if such an algorithm was invented as an attack on our method, it
would constitute a breakthrough result with insights for AI research.
Optimization – By interpreting authentication as a multi-agent interaction process, we can employ
concepts and algorithms for optimal decision making from reinforcement learning [26] to optimize
the security of the process. The idea is to enable communicating agents to be strategic about probing
each other’s reactions to maximize authentication accuracy, while obfuscating the interaction pro-
cess to outside observers via entropy-maximisation principles. We leverage reinforcement learning
applied to our authentication framework to optimize agent models for both security and efficiency.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are the following. We introduce a protocol for secure au-
thentication based on recognizing an agent from limited observations of its actions. We propose two
authentication tests, one using hypothesis testing and one using binary classification, and empirically
show that they obtain high accuracy in rejecting adversarial agents – even when the adversaries at-
tempt to imitate the legitimate client agent. Finally, we introduce a reinforcement learning approach
for training the authenticating server’s decision model to take effective probing actions that decrease
the amount of interaction required to successfully reject adversarial clients. Empirical evaluation
shows this approach leads to a more efficient protocol without a loss in accuracy at rejecting adver-
saries.
2 Related Work
Post-quantum alternatives: Researchers have developed a variety of quantum-safe alternatives to
public-key cryptography. Among these methods, those based on the fields of coding theory [25], lat-
tice theory [16], and multivariate quadratic polynomials [21] provide existing identification schemes.
Such schemes avoid quantum vulnerability by relying on problems for which there is no known
quantum algorithm, such as “syndrome decoding” from coding theory [9]. Our protocol, on the
other hand, achieves quantum-resistance based on the hardness of the opponent modelling problem
[1]. The use of optimization and decision-theoretic principles makes our approach fundamentally
different to other lines of investigation in post-quantum security which rely primarily on the devel-
opment of new cryptographic operators.
Multi-agent systems and modelling: Multi-agent systems have thus far been applied quite broadly
in the field of security, such as in [12] for security risk assessment. Computer networks in particular
have been viewed as multi-agent systems to capture and analyze highly complex dynamics between
active users and processes [6]. However, we believe there is currently no precedent for applying
multi-agent theory to cryptographic authentication.
Game theory / interactive processes: The dynamics of our agent-to-agent interaction are best de-
scribed by opponent modelling and game theory. Our interaction process gets its security from the
study of autonomous agents modelling other agents. We also use statistical hypothesis testing for
determining the correctness of agent models [2]. A related use of hypothesis testing is analyzing an
opponent’s probability of cheating in a one-way message authentication [15]. There is substantial
research on game theory for both cyber-security and cryptography, but the work specifically in au-
thentication is quite slim. One exception is [18], which transforms selected authentication schemes
using game-theoretic characterizations to discourage malicious acitivity.
Machine learning and neural networks: Our methods for agent-based authentication include the
use of neural networks. Among the uses of neural networks in cryptography are: secret key pro-
tocols, visual cryptography, and pseudo random number generators, with additional use cases for
authentication schemes [22]. An example of these schemes is biometric authentication [3]. Our
protocol, however, is best described as secure remote authentication, and we believe ours is the
first to use neural networks for making the authentication decision itself. Existing approaches for
remote authentication use neural networks differently, such as using networks to encode user access
privileges [14].
3 Authentication via Abstract Multi-agent Interaction
In this section, we introduce an authentication protocol based on abstract multi-agent interaction.
We call this protocol Authentication via Multi-agent Interaction (AMI; pronounced “Am I?"). In the
following, we use calligraphic letters (e.g., X ) to denote sets, lower case letters to denote elements
of sets and functions, and upper case letters to denote random variables. We use∆(X ) to denote the
set of all probability distributions over elements of set X .
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We consider a basic authentication setting in which a client seeks to authenticate to a server as a
particular user. The server must decide whether the client is the intended user or an adversarial
client attempting to access the server as the intended user. In the former case, we refer to the client
as a legitimate client; otherwise it is an adversarial client.
Client
model: πc
Server
model: πs
User: u
t = 0: A0c A
0
s
t = l: Alc A
l
s
...
Auth: yes iff. (A0c , ..., A
t
c) ∼ πu
Figure 1: Multi-agent Interaction Protocol
Protocol: When a client seeks to authenticate,
the server initiates an interaction process which
proceeds through time steps t = 0, 1, 2, ...., l.
At each time step t, the client and server in-
dependently choose actions Atc and A
t
s, respec-
tively, with values in a finite set of available ac-
tions, A := {1, ..., n}. The agents then send
their chosen actions to each other. The server
associates a probabilistic decision model, πu,
with each legitimate user; the decision model
is known only to the server agent and the legiti-
mate user. At the end of the interaction process,
the server decides whether the interaction history Hl := (A
0
s, A
0
c , ..., A
l
s, A
l
c) has been generated
with an agent using the decision model associated with the legitimate user. If the server decides it
has been interacting with this model, then it authenticates the client agent; otherwise, it rejects the
client agent.
We formalize decision models as functionsmapping the past interaction history to a distribution over
the available actions. That is, the client chooses actions with the model πc : Ht → ∆(A) whereHt
is the set of possible interaction histories up to time t. Similarly, the server agent chooses actions
with a model πs. Various model representations could be used, including probabilistic decision
trees, probabilistic finite state automata, and neural networks. Jointly, the server and client agent
define a distribution on l-step interaction histories, ps,c. If the client in the interaction process is
a legitimate client then they use the decision model πu (i.e., πc = πu) that is shared knowledge
between the server and legitimate client. To perform authentication, the server decides whether a
given interaction history has been produced by ps,u or not. To do so, we equip AMI with a test
function, test : Hl → {0, 1} that returns 1 if and only if an interactionH ∼ ps,u. In the following
section we will describe possible definitions for this test function. Figure 1 illustrates the AMI
protocol.
Key agreement: If the client is successfully authenticated, a secret session key can be computed
as a function key(Hl, π), where the client uses key(Ht, πc) and the server uses key(Hl, πu); if
πc = πu, then the computed keys will be equal. One possible implementation of the key function is
by concatenating the probabilities π(Atc|Hl), t = 0, ...l and pushing the resulting bit-string through
a suitable hash function to produce a key with a desired length. While key agreement is not a focus
of this paper, we mention it here to show that authentication and key agreement are both supported
by AMI, and because it highlights the precision at which an attacker would need to identify the
legitimate client model to authenticate and successfully generate the correct key.
Protocol security: An intruder who wants to authenticate as user u must reconstruct the correct
model πu based only on the observed history Hl and possibly recorded histories from previous
authentications. This problem of modelling the behavior of another agent is widely studied in AI re-
search and known to be hard [1]. For example, modelling another agent’s behavior as a deterministic
finite automaton is NP-complete in both the exact and approximate cases [10, 20].
Complexity theorists believe that quantum computers cannot efficiently solve this class of problem
[5]. Indeed, a complex model will involve very large parameter spaces and inferring correct parame-
ter values from a few observed authentications, each involving 10s or perhaps 100s of time steps, is
infeasible. Depending on the key generation function, producing equal client and server keys would
mandate identical probabilities in πc and πu, so even a close approximate model would be unable to
compute the key.
Extension to more than two agents: The AMI protocol also supports mutual group authentication
in which more than two parties authenticate to each other. In this case, each agent i = 1, ...,m
has its own model πi which is a shared secret with all other legitimate agents. The models are now
defined over interaction histories which include the chosen actions of all agents at each time step,
(At
1
, ..., Atm). Each agent authenticates each other agent using an authentication test, and the key
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function is similarly defined over all models, key(Hl, π1, ..., πm). However, in the rest of the paper
we will focus on the basic setting in which a client authenticates to a server only.
4 Authentication Tests
In this section, we propose two possible authentication test functions for the AMI protocol which
return 1 if and only if Hl ∼ ps,u. In Section 5 we empirically evaluate their usage in the AMI
protocol.
4.1 Hypothesis Testing
Our first authentication test uses the framework of frequentist hypothesis testing to decide whether a
given interaction history was generated between the server and a legitimate client or an adversarial
client. For a given history, h, we first specify the null hypothesis “h was generated from πu." To
decide on the correctness of this hypothesis, we compute a test statistic from the interaction history
and determine whether the test statistic value is too extreme for the distribution of the test statistic
under the null hypothesis. More formally, letting z : H → R denote a test statistic function, a
hypothesis test computes the p-value:
p := Pr(|z(h)| ≥ |z(H)|)
where H ∼ πu. Intuitively, p is the probability of observing a z value at least as extreme as z(h)
if interacting with the legitimate client model. The p-value is then compared to a pre-determined
significance level, α, to determine whether the interaction came from the legitimate client or not:
test(h) =
{
1 (authenticate) if p-value≥ α
0 (reject) if p-value< α .
(1)
We use a hypothesis test from [2] that was designed for non-stationary multi-agent interaction; for
brevity we omit its full description. Essentially, this test defines a test statistic for multi-agent in-
teraction, learns the distribution of this test statistic during an interaction, and computes p from the
learned distribution. Computation of the test statistic requires manually defined score functions that
can be interpreted as the likelihood that an interaction came from the legitimate client; in this work
we use a combination of the score functions defined by [2].
An important advantage of the hypothesis testing approach is its interpretability. The p-value has a
well-defined semantics and the significance level α allows us to exactly control the false negative
rate of the test.1 A disadvantage of the hypothesis testing framework is that the default decision (i.e.,
the null hypothesis) is to accept the authenticating client. We will show that this disadvantage can be
eliminated with sufficiently long interaction horizons and strategic decision-making from the server.
4.2 Supervised Learning
We also introduce a learnable test function based on binary classification which avoids the need to
manually specify score functions. Given access to the legitimate client model, we first generate
a large number of interactions between the server and legitimate client agents. We also generate
an additional set of interactions between the server and different adversarial client agents from a
population of such adversaries. With both generated data sets, we train a binary classifier (e.g.,
a neural network) to distinguish between legitimate and adversarial interactions. Using a binary
classifier has the advantage that the decision rule is learned rather than based on manually specified
score functions; the disadvantage is that a neural network classifier is difficult to interpret.
5 Empirical Study: Authentication Tests
We now present an empirical study of the proposed authentication tests with the AMI protocol. Our
experiments are primarily designed to answer the questions: 1) can our proposed authentication
tests correctly accept a legitimate client, and 2) can they correctly reject adversarial clients? We also
study how the length of interactions affects accuracy of different authentication tests.
1If the given history h was collected from piu then p is uniformly distributed between [0, 1] and so a false
negative occurs at the rate α.
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5.1 Authentication Tests Empirical Set-up
In our basic empirical setting, we use interactions of length 200. The agents choose actions from
A = {1, 2, 3, ..., 10} for the hypothesis test, and from A = {1, 2, 3} for the supervised learning
to reduce the amount of data needed for training in our experiments. We specify the server model
and legitimate client model as probabilistic decision trees (PDT) – trees in which each node has
a probability distribution over actions (see Figure 4 in Appendix A). The tree is traversed using
the k = 5 most recent actions of the other agent (e.g., the client tree is traversed with the server’s
actions). Thus the tree encodes a distribution over actions given the k most recent actions of the
other agent. We choose PDTs as they are computationally cheap to sample actions from and easy to
randomly generate; in principle other decision models, such as neural networks, could be used.
For each experimental trial run, we randomly generate the server and true user decision model by
setting each node in the PDT to be a Boltzmann distribution [23] with logit values sampled uniformly
in [0, 1] and temperature parameter τ . The server decision model uses the value τ = 1.0 for near-
uniform random action selection; the client uses a τ value of 0.1. We find lower entropy in the
client’s action selection leads to better authentication accuracy with shorter interaction lengths. We
make this choice for empirical convenience; in practice higher entropy could be used but would
require longer interaction histories. In each experimental trial, we generate 100 interactions between
the server and legitimate client and measure accuracy of each authentication test. We also evaluate
interactions between the server agent and adversarial agents. We formulate the following adversarial
behaviors to create such interactions:
Random: Randomly generate 100 unique adversarial PDTs with same dimensions and temperature
τ as the legitimate client PDT. Generate 100 interactions total between the server and these PDTs.
Replay: Generate 100 legitimate interactions. Replay client actions from these interactions back to
the server to create 100 adversarial “replayed” interactions.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE): Generate 100 legitimate interactions. Compute a max-
imum likelihood estimate of legitimate client PDT, using an identical PDT structure. Generate 100
interactions between the server and this estimated client.
To evaluate each authentication test we generate a set of interactions with length l = 200 between
the server and the legitimate client, and a set between the server and each type of adversarial behav-
ior. We report authentication accuracy on each set of interactions as the percentage of interactions
correctly identified as either legitimate or adversarial (Random, Replay, or MLE).
For supervised learning we use feedforward neural networks with two hidden layers and 600 hidden
units in each layer. The networks take the entire interaction history as input with the integer actions
given a one-hot encoding. For the supervised learning authentication test, we generate a population
of random adversaries from the same random process that generated the server and client agent. The
learned classifiers have logistic output units and use a decision threshold of 0.5 where an output
greater than 0.5 indicates a legitimate client. For the hypothesis testing algorithm we use the score
functions suggested by [2] and a significance level of α = 0.1.
5.2 Authentication Tests Empirical Results
Figure 2(a) shows the empirical accuracy of our two authentication tests. We observe that the hypoth-
esis test gives high accuracy across all three metrics. Its accuracy on interactions with the legitimate
client is higher than predicted given the significance level α = 0.9 which should yield an expected
accuracy of 0.9. This result likely reflects random variation in the finite number of trials conducted.
The supervised learning test gives lower authentication accuracy on all three metrics compared to
hypothesis testing. While this result may appear negative, we highlight that the reasonable accuracy
numbers demonstrate the applicability of neural networks in such an authentication test. This result
raises the possibility of further improvement by enhancing the population of adversaries used dur-
ing training, possibly using ideas from generative adversarial networks [11]. We demonstrate one
possible setup for this training in the Appendix.
We further analyze the effect of the interaction length, l, on the accuracy metrics reported. For this
experiment we only consider the hypothesis test authentication test. Figure 2(b) shows accuracy for
all metrics as a function of l. As expected we see that longer interactions lead to higher accuracy for
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Figure 2: (a) Figure 2(a) gives the accuracy of the two authentication tests on each considered
metric. (b) Figure 2(b) shows hypothesis test accuracy as a function of interaction length. For each
considered interaction length we evaluate accuracy on each metric.
the random, replay, andmle metrics and that once interactions are sufficiently long (l > 50) accuracy
is close to perfect. As expected, accuracy on real data is unaffected by the interaction length. In the
following sections, we will demonstrate that intelligent probing from the server can further improve
on these results by minimizing the number of interactions required for authentication.
6 Effective Server Actions via Reinforcement Learning
An accurate authentication test is a crucial component of the AMI protocol. However, the efficiency
(as measured by the required interaction length) of AMI also depends on the actions generated by the
server policy, πs. Consider the case where the server interacts with an adversarial client who uses a
decision model that is identical to πu, except after the server taking the action sequence 1, 2, 1, 3, 1
the adversarial client chooses action 1 while the legitimate user would take action 2. If the server
policy takes the given sequence then it will quickly be able to differentiate the adversary from the
legitimate user. We refer to the server policy’s actions as probing actions. Even if the adversarial
client model and true user model have overlapping support, effective probing actions can lead to
higher confidence decisions by an authentication test. In this section, we show how an effective
server probing policy can be learned for a given user policy πu via reinforcement learning (RL)
[26].
We pose the learning problem as follows. During training, the server policy interacts with unknown
clients over a series of episodes where each episode runs a AMI authentication process with a fixed
client. The client changes at the beginning of each episode. More specifically, at step t = 0 of
an episode, we either choose the legitimate client2 or sample an adversarial client from a given
population of adversarial agents. The server policy then interacts with this client for the next l steps.
At step t of the interaction, the server policy observes the state of the interaction St and chooses
an action Ats. For now we leave the definition of the state-space open; in general, it depends on
all the past actions of the client and server since πc may choose actions based on all past actions.
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After taking actionAts, the server receives a reward,R
t, in the form of a confidencemeasure from the
authentication test being used (e.g., we can use 1−p for the hypothesis test presented in Section 4.1).
After each episode ends, we sample a new client and begin a new episode. The learning objective is:
πs ∈ argmax
pi
E
[ l∑
t=0
Rt
]
, (2)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution over clients and policy actions. By
applying an RL algorithm to optimize (2) w.r.t. the server policy, we obtain a policy that attempts to
quickly reach high confidence decisions.
2In the case of the hypothesis test, there is no need to consider the legitimate client during training as, for
the legitimate client, the p-value is uniformly distributed regardless of the server’s actions.
3By definition, if the state-space includes all past information observed by the server it is a Markov state as
is typically used in RL [26].
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In RL it is common to use a stochastic policy during learning but to deploy a deterministic policy
after learning has concluded. For the AMI protocol, it is necessary that the final server policy main-
tain entropy in its action selection even after learning has concluded. Otherwise, an adversary can
fool the authentication test by recording a reaction with the legitimate client and then replaying that
client’s actions. If the server policy is deterministic then this replay attack will cause the authenti-
cation test to incorrectly authenticate the adversary. One approach to mitigate this issue is to have
the policy occasionally take random actions to prevent such an attack, e.g., ǫ-greedy action selection
where the server takes a random action with probability ǫ and the learned optimal action otherwise.
In the next section we evaluate the importance of maintaining stochasticity in the server’s policy in
addition to optimizing for authentication confidence.
7 Empirical Study: Optimized Probing
We conduct an empirical study of the effectiveness of optimizing the server agent’s policy. Our
study addresses the questions: 1) can effective probing lead to more efficient authentication relative
to random probing and 2) does optimized probing decrease security against replay attacks?
7.1 Optimized Probing Empirical Set-up
In these experiments we only consider the hypothesis testing authentication test. As before, the
legitimate user model is a PDT that is generated randomly. The server policy is replaced with a
neural network with GRU recurrent units [8] that outputs the parameters of a softmax distribution
over actions. We define the state, st, of the interaction at time t as the node of the legitimate user
model PDT that would be visited if the server was interacting with the legitimate user. That is, while
interacting with an unknown client the server policy simultaneously replays the same interaction
with the known, legitimate user model and uses the state of the legitimate user model as the state
of the interaction. This state representation is independent of the unknown adversarial agent and
thus the server policy can learn a policy that traverses the known legitimate client in a way that
is expected to identify an adversarial client with shorter interactions. In contrast to the empirical
evaluation in Section 5, the legitimate user model has higher entropy (τ = 0.5 in it’s randomly
generated Boltzmann distribution) as this increases the need for effective probing. We use |A| = 3
and maximum interaction lengths of 100 steps.
We use the A2C synchronous variant of the A3C algorithm [17] as the RL algorithm for training the
server policy. We do not expect this algorithm choice to significantly impact the results, and A2C was
the first algorithm we tried. We use an open source pytorch implementation of the algorithm [13].
We train the server policy for 200,000 steps with 30 environment steps taken across three parallel
processes for each policy update. For a population of adversarial agents to train against we use a set
of randomly generated PDTs; we use a separate set of randomly generated PDTs for evaluation. After
training, we freeze the final server policy and evaluate the rate of p-value convergence using ǫ-greedy
action selection with ǫ = 0.25. As baselines, we evaluate a uniform random probing policy and the
deterministic probing policy that never takes random actions (ǫ = 0.0). The first establishes the
benefit of optimized probing and the second establishes the importance of stochasticity for security.
7.2 Optimized Probing Empirical Results
Figure 3(a) shows that training the server policy leads, on average, to a lower p-value with shorter in-
teractions. The deterministic baseline policy leads to the quickest convergence since it always takes
the action that leads to a lower p-value. The stochastic ǫ-greedy policy has a slower convergence
because it takes some actions to lower p-value and some random actions to increase stochasticity in
the interaction. Uniform random action selection leads to the slowest p-value convergence – taking
25% more steps than the stochastic RL policy. This result answers our first empirical question and
shows that effective probing leads to more efficient authentication decisions.
Figure 3(b) gives the mean p-value for each policy when interacting with 100 replay adversaries.
This result illustrates the importance of randomness in maintaining security with optimized probing.
The deterministic policy led to a mean p-value of around 0.5 which is the same as if the policy was
interacting with the legitimate client model. The stochastic policies – ǫ-greedy and uniform random
– maintain a high mean p-value because stochasticity throws off simply replaying the legitimate
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Figure 3: (a) The p-value in the hypothesis test falls over time depending on which server policy is
used. Interactions are between the server policy and random adversaries. Error bars show standard
error. (b) Mean final p-value when the server interacts with replay adversaries (l = 100 time steps).
client’s actions. Taken together, Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show that we can optimize the server policy
with reinforcement learning to increase efficiency while maintaining security. This results also an-
swers our second empirical question and shows that optimized probing does not decrease security
against replay attacks if stochasticity is maintained in action selection.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed a novel approach to secure authentication modelled as multi-agent
interaction. We introduced the Authentication via Multi-agent Interaction (AMI) protocol that makes
authentication decisions based on the stochastic interaction between a client and server agent. As
this protocol requires efficient tests to determine whether an interaction was generated between
the server and a legitimate user, we introduce two such tests and empirically evaluate that they
distinguish legitimate from adversarial clients with high accuracy. Finally, we introduced an RL
approach that optimizes both the security and efficiency of the AMI protocol.
Our empirical study instantiated the AMI protocol, empirically validated different proposed authen-
tication tests, and demonstrated the additional benefit of optimizing the server’s decision model. In
particular, we found that an authentication test based on multi-agent hypothesis testing led to per-
fect accuracy against adversarial client agents. We also found that optimizing the server’s decision
making led to more efficient authentication decisions.
While both proposed authentication tests give high accuracy against adversarial clients, their main
limitation is lower accuracy on legitimate interactions. For the hypothesis test, the expected accuracy
with legitimate clients is directly controlled by the significance level, α. Longer interaction histories
than those used in our experiments would allow a smaller α value without diminishing the other
accuracy metrics. The supervised learning test may also be promising for balancing all metrics
though it is currently limited by the quality of the adversarial agent population used to generate
training data.
We also outline a couple of future directions that go beyond the scope of the current work. Impor-
tantly, this work lays the ground work for multi-party authentication through multi-agent systems.
Such a system raises new questions for how agents can jointly optimize security and efficiency;
we believe that multi-agent reinforcement learning may offer a promising solution [19]. Also, the
hypothesis testing authentication test provides high accuracy but is limited by requiring manually
specified score functions. Future work could investigate learning these score functions to optimize
detection efficiency. Finally, future work could consider variable-length interactions – such an au-
thentication test could be more active in collecting additional information when facing decision
uncertainty.
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A Probabilistic Decision Tree (PDT)
P (A)
t− 1
t− 2
t− 3 2
3
2
Figure 4: An example probabilistic decision tree of depth 3 with 3 actions.
Figure 4 illustrates a probabilistic decision tree (PDT) being used as an agent’s behavioral decision
model. Each node in the tree individually specifies a probability distribution over the action space.
In this example, the other agent in the interaction has provided actions {2, 3, 2}. The agent having
PDT in Figure 4 uses the k = 3 most recent actions of the other agent to traverse its tree.
At each time step, it descends a level deeper into the PDT with the next provided action. For example,
at t − 3, it descends to one level below the root node, using {2} to follow the middle branch. It
continues traversing until the actions list is exhausted. In this case, this occurs as it arrives at the
leaf nodes, having traversed there by the final action, {2}, at time t− 1. Finally, at time t, the agent
is ready to sample its own action from the leaf node’s Boltzmann distribution P (A).
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